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Abstract
In this short note we give the example of a four-person finite positional game with perfect information
that has no positions of chance and no Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. The corresponding
directed graph has only one directed cycle and only five terminal positions. It remains open:
• (i) if the number n of the players can be reduced from 4 to 3,
• (ii) if the number p of the terminals can be reduced from 5 to 4, and most important,
• (iii) whether it is possible to get a similar example in which the outcome c corresponding to all
(possibly, more than one) directed cycles is worse than every terminal for each player.
Yet, it is known that
• (j) n cannot be reduced to 2,
• (jj) p cannot be reduced to 3, and
• (jjj) there can be no similar example in which each player makes a decision in a unique position.
Keywords: stochastic, positional, chess-like, transition-free games with perfect information and
without moves of chance; Nash equilibrium, directed cycles (dicycles), terminal position.
1 Introduction
In this paper we answer in the negative to one of the two open questions suggested in [3]. This negative
result was conjectured in [30]. We refer the reader to these two papers for definitions of the chess-like
and backgammon-like games, and of of Nash-solvability, which we recall here just briefly.
The backgammon-like and chess-like games are finite positional n-person games with perfect informa-
tion, which can and, respectively, cannot have random moves.
More precisely, such a game is modeled by a finite directed graph (digraph) G = (V,E), whose vertices
are partitioned into n + 2 subsets: V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vn ∪ VT ∪ VR. A vertex v ∈ Vi is interpreted as a
position controlled by the player i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, while v ∈ VR is a positions of chance, with a given
probabilistic distribution on the outgoing edges; finally, v ∈ VT = {a1, . . . , ap} is a terminal position
(or just a terminal, for short), which has no outgoing edges. Furthermore, a directed edge (v, v′) is
interpreted as a move from the position v to v′. We also fix an initial position v0 ∈ V \ VT .
A game is called chess-like if it has no positions of chance, VR = ∅.
The digraph G may have directed cycles (dicycles). Recall that positions may be repeated in a
backgammon or in a chess play. We assume that all dicycles of G form a unique outcome c of the game.
Thus, the set of outcomes is A = {a1, . . . , ap; c}.
Remark 1 In [10] a different approach was suggested (for n = 2): each dicycle was treated as a separate
outcome. Anyway, our main example contains only one dicycle.
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To each player i ∈ I and outcome a ∈ A we assign a payoff (called in the literature also a reward,
utility, or profit) u(i, a) of the player i ∈ I in case the outcome a ∈ A is realized. The corresponding
mapping u : I × A→ R is called the payoff (reward, utility, or profit) function.
Since our main result is negative and related to chess-like games, we could restrict ourselves and the
players to their strict preferences, instead of the real-valued payoffs. A complete order oi over A is called
the preference of the player i ∈ I ; and let o = (o1, . . . , on) denote a preference profile.
A backgammon-like game in the positional form is the quadruple (G,D, o, v0), where G = (V,E) is a
digraph, D : V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vn ∪ VT ∪ VR is a partition of the positions, o = (o1, . . . , on) is a preference
profile, and v0 is a fixed initial position. The triplet (G,D, v0) is called a positional game form.
To define the normal form (of a chess-like game) let us introduce the strategies. A (pure and sta-
tionary) strategy of a player i ∈ I is a mapping that assigns a move (v, v′) to each position v ∈ Vi.
(In this paper we restrict ourselves and the players to their pure stationary strategies, so mixed and
history dependent strategies will not even be introduced.) A set of n strategies s = {si, i ∈ I} is called
a strategy profile or a situation. Each situation uniquely defines a play P (s) that begins in v0 and either
ends in a terminal a ∈ VT or cycles. In the latter case P (s) looks like a “lasso”: it consists of an initial
part and a dicycle repeated infinitely. This is so, because a (pure stationary) strategy assigns the same
move whenever a position is repeated and, hence, each situation s uniquely defines a move (v, v′) in each
non-terminal position v ∈ V \ VT . Thus, we obtain a game form, that is, a mapping g : S → A, where
S = S1 × . . . × Sn is the direct product of the sets Si = {s
i
1, . . . , s
i
ki
} of strategies of all players i ∈ I .
The normal form of a chess-like game (G,D, o, v0) is defined as the pair (g, o).
For the backgammon-like games each strategy profile s uniquely determines a Markovian chain, which
assigns to each outcome a ∈ A (a terminal or an infinite play) a well defined limit probability p(s, a).
The payoff u(i, s) of a player i ∈ I in this situation s is defined as the expectation of the corresponding
payoffs u(i, s)
∑
a∈A p(s, a)u(i, a).
A situation s ∈ S is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for each player i ∈ I and for each situation s′
that may differ from s only in the coordinate i, the inequalities oi(g(s)) ≥ oi(g(s
′)) and u(i, s)) ≥ u(i, s′)
hold in case of the chess- and backgammon-like games, respectively; or in other words, if no player i ∈ I
can profit replacing his/her strategy si in s by a new strategy s′i, provided the n− 1 remaining players
keep their strategies unchanged. Let us remark that the equality oi(g(s)) = oi(g(s
′)) may hold only when
g(s) = g(s′), since the preference oi is strict.
2 The main example
The positional and normal forms of the game announced in the title of the paper are presented below by
Figure 1 and Table 1, respectively.
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Figure 1: This figure represents our main example in the positional form.
Four players I = {1, 2, 3, 4} make decisions in eight non-terminal positions u1, v1;u2, v2, w2;u3, v3, and u4,
respectively. The subscript is the number of the player who controls the corresponding position.
The initial position is u1. There are five terminal positions aj : j ∈ J = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
There is a unique dicycle c and, thus, the set of outcomes is A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5; c}.
The game has no NE whenever the preferences oi of the players i ∈ I over the set of outcomes A agree with
the following partial orders:
O1 : a2 > a4 > a3 > a1 > a5; O2 : min(a1, c) > a3 > max(a4, a5) > min(a4, a5) > a2;
O3 : min(a5, c) > a1 > a2 > max(a3, a4); O4 : min(a1, a2, a3, a5) > a4 > c.
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Table 1: This table represents our main example in the normal form.
The game form g : S → A, in which S = S1 × S2 × S3 × S4 and A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5; c}, is given by the
four-dimensional table of size 6× 8× 4× 2.
Player 1 has six strategies:
s1
1
: (u1, u2), (v1, v2), s
1
2
: (u1, u3), (v1, v2),
s1
3
: (u1, u2), (v1, u4), s
1
4
: (u1, u3), (v1, u4),
s15: (u1, u2), (v1, w2), s
1
6: (u1, u3), (v1, w2);
player 2 has eight strategies:
s21: (u2, v1), (v2, u4), (w2, u3), s
2
2: (u2, v3), (v2, u4), (w2, u3),
s2
3
: (u2, v1), (v2, a3), (w2, u3), s
2
4
: (u2, v3), (v2, a3), (w2, u3),
s2
5
: (u2, v1), (v2, u4), (w2, a5), s
2
6
: (u2, v3), (v2, u4), (w2, a5),
s27: (u2, v1), (v2, a3), (w2, a5), s
2
8: (u2, v3), (v2, a3), (w2, a5);
player 3 has four strategies:
s3
1
: (u3, v3), (v3, v2), s
3
2
: (u3, a1), (v3, v2), s
3
3
: (u3, v3), (v3, a2), s
3
4
: (u3, a1), (v3, a2);
finally, player 4 has two strategies: s41(u4, w2), s
4
2(u4, a4).
It is not difficult (although time consuming) to verify that the corresponding game has no NE whenever the
preference profile o = {o1, o2, o3, o4} of the players I = {1, 2, 3, 4} agrees with the following partial orders:
O1 : a2 > a4 > a3 > a1 > a5; O2 : min(a1, c) > a3 > max(a4, a5) > min(a4, a5) > a2;
O3 : min(a5, c) > a1 > a2 > max(a3, a4); O4 : min(a1, a2, a3, a5) > a4 > c.
For every situation s = (s1ℓ1 , s
2
ℓ2
, s3ℓ3 , s
4
ℓ4
) ∈ S1×S2×S3×S4 = S the outcome g(s), which is either a terminal
aj or the dicycle c, is shown in the entry (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3, ℓ4) of the table. The upper indices indicate the players
who can improve the situation s. Thus, a situation s is a NE if and only if the corresponding outcome has
no upper indices. Since the table contains no such situation, the considered game has no NE.
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3 Open ends
In the above example there are four players, n = 4, five terminals, p = 5, and there is only one dicycle.
In [8] it was shown that there is no chess-like NE-free game with p ≤ 2 terminals. In [11], Boros and
Rand extended this result p ≤ 3. Thus, only the case p = 4 remains open.
It is known that every two-person chess-like game has a NE; see [8, 10], the last section of each paper.
Thus, only the case n = 3 remains open.
The proof for n = 2 is simple and we repeat it here for convenience of the readers. It is based on the
following important property of the two-person game forms, which seems not to be extendable for n > 2.
A two-person game form g is called (i) Nash-solvable, (ii) zero-sum-solvable, and (iii) ±1-solvable if
the corresponding game (g, u) has at least one NE (i) for every payoff u = (u1, u2); (ii) for every payoff
u = (u1, u2) such that u1(a)+u2(a) = 0 for each outcome a ∈ A; (iii) for every payoff u = (u1, u2) such
that u1(a) + u2(a) = 0 for each outcome a ∈ A and both u1 and u2 take only values +1 or −1.
In fact, all three above properties of a game forms are equivalent. For (ii) and (iii) this was shown in
1970 by Edmonds and Fulkerson [14] and independently in [23]. Then, the list was extended by statement
(i) in [24]; see also [25], where it also shown that a similar statement fails for the three-person game forms.
Thus, it is sufficient to prove ±1-solvability, rather than Nash-solvability, of the two-person chess-like
games. Hence, we can assume that each outcome a ∈ A = VT ∪ {c} is either winning for player 1 and
losing for player 2, or vice versa. Without any loss of generality, assume that c is winning for 1.
Then, let VT = V
1
T ∪ V
2
T be the partition of all terminals into outcomes winning for players 1 and 2,
respectively. Furthermore, let V 2 ⊆ V denote the set of all positions from which player 2 can enforce
V 2T ; in particular, V
2
T ⊆ V
2. Finally, let us set V 1 = V \ V 2; in particular, V 1T ⊆ V
1.
By the above definitions, in every position v ∈ V1 ∩ V
1 player 1 can stay out of V 2, that is, (s)he
has a move (v, v′) such that v′ ∈ V 1. Let us fix a strategy s10 that chooses such a move in each position
v ∈ V1 ∩ V
1 and any move in v ∈ V1 ∩ V
2. Then, for any s2 ∈ S2, the outcome g(s
1
0, s
2) is winning for
player 1 whenever the initial position v0 is in V
1. Indeed, either g(s10, s2) ∈ V
1
T , or g(s
1
0, s
2) = c; in both
cases player 1 wins. Thus, player 1 wins when v0 ∈ V
1 and player 2 wins when v0 ∈ V
2; in each case a
saddle point exists.
In [30], we conjectured that there is a NE-free chess-like game satisfying the following extra condition
• (C) outcome c is worse than any terminal outcome a ∈ VT for each player i ∈ I .
This conjecture remains open. Such an example, if exists, would strengthen simultaneously the
example of the present paper and the main example of [30]; see Figure 2 and Table 2 there.
Remark 2 In [3], 16 problems related to Nash-solvability, subgame perfect and not, of the chess-like
and backgammon-like games were considered, under the assumption (C) and without it. For 15 of these
problems, condition (C) appears “irrelevant”, that is, either Nash-solvability holds, even without (C),
or even with (C), it fails. (Yet, in the latter case, the size of the corresponding example may increase
significantly.) Based on these observations, we conjectured in [30] that the same will happen for the last
16th case, which is the subject of the present paper. An example might be similar to one in Figure 1,
but with a much larger digraph. Several interpretations of assumption (C) were suggested Remark 2 and
Section 2.1.1 of [8].
Finally, it follows from the main result of [8] that there is no NE-free n-person chess-like game in
which each player controls a unique position. In the above example, the players 1, 2, 3, and 4 control
2, 3, 2, and 1 positions, respectively. It remains open, if there is a chess-like NE-free game in which each
player controls, say, at most two positions.
4 Related results on Nash-solvability
In the next two subsections we recall two large families of games with perfect information that are known
to be Nash-solvable in pure stationary uniformly optimal strategies.
4.1 Acyclyc n-person backgammon-like games with perfect information
In 1950 Nash introduced his concept of equilibrium for the normal form n-person games [40, 41]. Soon
after, Kuhn [34, 35] and Gale [20] suggested the backward induction procedure and proved that any
finite acyclic chess-like game with perfect information has a NE in pure stationary strategies; moreover,
5
the obtained NE is subgame perfect, that is, the same strategy profile is a NE with respect to any initial
position. The authors restricted themselves to the chess-like games on finite arborescence (directed trees)
but, in fact, backward induction can be easily extended to the backgammon-like games on the finite
digraphs without dicycles (so called acyclic digraphs or DAGs). Yet, acyclicity is a crucial assumption
and cannot be waved.
For any integer k ≥ 2 let us introduce a digraph Gk that consists of k terminals a1, . . . , ak, the directed
k-cycle Ck on the k non-terminal vertices v1, . . . , vk, and the perfect matching (vj , aj), j = 1, . . . , k
between these vertices and the terminals.
The existence of a subgame perfect NE fails already for k = 2 [1]. Let players 1 and 2 control vertices
v1 and v2 and have the preferences, o1 : (c > a1 > a2) and (a1 > a2 > c), respectively. It is easy to verify
that a NE exists for any given initial position, v1 or v2, but no strategy profile is a NE with respect to
both simultaneously. Let us notice that the preferences are not opposite (both players prefer a1 to a2),
while c is the worst outcome for player 2 and the best one for 1.
A similar example exists even if in addition we require (C): the dicycle is worse than each terminal for
both players. Consider digraph G6 in which players 1 ad 2 control the odd and even positions (a1, a3, a5
and a2, a4, a6) respectively. It was shown in [3] that there exists no subgame perfect NE whenever
o1 : a6 > a5 > a2 > a1 > a3 > a4 > c; o2 ∈ O2 : {a3 > a2 > a6 > a4 > a5 > c, a6 > a1 > c}.
Note that there is no such example for G4. A similar example for a three-person game was constructed
in [3]. The players 1, 2, 3 control, respectively, the positions v1, v2, v3 of G3 and have the preferences:
o1 : a2 > a1 > a3 > c; o2 : a3 > a2 > a1 > c; o3 : a1 > a3 > a2 > c.
In other words, for all players: c is the worst outcome, in accordance with (C); it is better if the
previous player terminate; it is still better to terminate himself; finally, the best if the next player
terminates.
In [7], these results were strengthen as follows. It was demonstrated that a subgame perfect NE may
fail to exist not only in the pure but even in thee mixed strategies. The corresponding examples are
based on the same positional game forms, G6 for n = 2 and G3 for n = 3, but the above preference
profiles are replaced by some carefully chosen payoffs, which agree with the corresponding preferences.
The above examples imply that, for any n ≥ 2, an n-person backgammon-like game, even with a fixed
initial position, may have no NE. Given a chess-like game (G = (V,E), D, o), in which no initial position
is fixed yet, add to it a new position v0 and the move (v0, v) from v0 to each non-terminal position
v ∈ V \ VT . Furthermore, assign to (v0, v) a non-negative probability pv ≥ 0 such that
∑
v∈V
pv = 1.
Denote by (G′, D, o, v0) the obtained backgammon-like game form, in which v0 is the initial position; see
Figure 1 in [3]. It was shown in [3] that
• (i) if s is a subgame perfect NE in (G,D, o) then s is a NE in (G′, D, o, v0) for any pv;
• (ii) if s is a NE in (G′, D, o, v0) and pv > 0 ∀v ∈ V \VT , then s is a subgame perfect NE in (Gk, D, o).
These results imply that Nash-solvability of (G′, D, v0) is equivalent with subgame perfect Nash-
solvability of (G,D). As we know, the latter property may fail for G = Gk for any n ≥ 2. Thus, for
any n ≥ 2, an n-person backgammon-like game (G′k, D, v0, o), in which v0 is a unique position of chance,
may have no NE.
4.2 Two-person zero-sum games with perfect information
According to the previous subsection, in the presence of dicycles, backward induction fails, in general.
Yet, it can be modified (and thus saved) in case of the two-person zero-sum games (that is, when I = {1, 2}
and u(1, a)+ u(2, a) = 0 for any outcome a ∈ A, or two preferences o1 and o2 of the players 1 and 2 over
A are opposite).
For example, the recent paper [22] shows how to solve by backward induction a two-person zero-sum
game that is “acyclic”, but the players can pass; in other words, the corresponding digraph contains a
loop at each vertex, but no other dicycles.
A general linear time algorithm solving ay two-person zero-sum chess-like game, by a modified back-
ward induction, was suggested in [2] and independently in [3]. In contrast, no polynomial algorithm is
known for the two-person zero-sum backgammon-like games [12, 13]. However, it is well-known that
subgame perfect saddle points in stationary strategies exist in this case and even in much more general
cases considered below.
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In fact, studying two-person zero-sum chess-like games began long before the backward induction
was suggested in early fifties by [34, 35, 20]. Zermelo gave his seminal talk on solvablity of chess in pure
strategies [46] as early as in 1912. Later, Ko¨nig [33] and Kalman [32] strengthen this result showing that
there exist pure stationary uniformly optimal strategies producing a subgame perfect saddle point, in
any two-person zero-sum chess-like game. The reader can find more detailed surveys in [45, 17, 42, 2];
see also [9, 18, 19, 28].
The chess-like and backgammon-like games, considered in this note, by the definition, are transition-
free. There is a much more general class: stochastic games with perfect information in which a transition
payoff ri(u, v) is defined for every move (u, v) and for each player i ∈ I . Gillette, in his seminal paper [21],
introduced the mean (or average) effective payoff for these games and proved the existence of subgame
perfect saddle point in the uniformly optimal stationary strategies for the two-person zero-sum case.
The proof is pretty complicated. It is based on the Tauberian theory and, in particular, on the Hardy-
Littlewood theorem [31]. (In [21], the conditions of this theorem were not accurately verified and the
flaw was corrected in twelve years by Liggett and Lippman in [37].)
Stochastic games with perfect information can be viewed as backgammon-like games with transition
payoffs. More precisely, these two classes are polynomially equivalent [4]. Interestingly, the corresponding
two-person zero-sum chess-like games (with transition payoffs but without random moves) so-called cyclic
mean-payoff games, appeared only 20-30 years later, introduced for the complete bipartite digraphs by
Moulin [38, 39], for any bipartite digraphs by Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [15, 16], and for arbitrary
digraphs by Gurvich, Karzanov, and Khachiyan [29]. Again, the existence of a saddle point in the pure
stationary uniformly optimal strategies was proven for the two-person zero-sum case.
This result cannot be extend to the non-zero-sum case. In [25], a cyclic mean payoff two-person
NE-free game was constructed on the complete bipartite 3 × 3 digraph with symmetric payoffs. (The
corresponding normal form game is a 27 × 27 bimatrix.) It was shown in [27] that this example is, in a
sense, minimal, namely, a NE always exists for the games on the complete (2× ℓ) bipartite digraphs.
A general family of the so-called k-total effective payoffs was recently introduced in [6] for any non-
negative integer k such that the 0-total one is the mean effective payoff, while the 1-total one is the total
effective payoff introduced earlier by Thuijsman and Vrieze in [43, 44]. The existence of a saddle point
in uniformly optimal pure stationary strategies for the two-person zero-sum chess-like games with the
k-total effective payoff was proven for all k in [6]. If this result can be extended to the backgammon-like
games is an open problem. Yet, for k ≤ 1 the answer is positive. As was already mentioned, for k = 0 it
was proven long ago. For k = 1 the result was first obtained in [43, 44], see also [6].
However, it cannot be extended to the non-zero-sum case. In particular, a NE (in pure stationary
strategies) may fail to exist already in a two-person chess-like game. For k = 0 the example was given in
[25]. Furthermore, in [6], a simple embedding of the (k− 1)-total payoff games into the k-total ones was
constructed. Thus, the example of [25] works for all k.
Acknowledgemets: The authors are thankful to Endre Boros, Konrad Borys, Khaled Elbassioni,
and Gabor Rudolf for helpful discussions.
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